

The U.S. Department of Justice’s updated Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP) establishes that “full,” “proactive,” and “voluntary” cooperation by companies in FCPA investigations is necessary to earn CEP incentives, including declination. Even absent self-disclosure, such cooperation (paired with effective remediation) can result in significant fine reductions. Companies undergoing FCPA investigations face various considerations when undertaking cooperation efforts under current DOJ and SEC expectations.
The CEP states that “a company starts at zero cooperation credit and then earns credit for specific cooperative actions.” These actions accrete over the course of the investigation and the DOJ “assess[es] the scope, quantity, quality, and timing of cooperation based on the circumstances of each case.”
CEP incentives depend on whether “aggravating circumstances” are present; if they are, companies must engage in “extraordinary” cooperation with the DOJ’s investigation. DOJ officials have stated that whether cooperation is “extraordinary” is measured by general concepts such as “immediacy, consistency, degree, and impact.” More recently, DOJ personnel have noted that “every case is different” but that “[w]e provide the greatest benefits to those that act with urgency and truly go above and beyond.”
DOJ officials have encouraged companies to examine recent FCPA cases for examples of cooperation that benefits companies under the CEP. A review of such cases, including SAP, Albemarle, and the Gartner SEC settlement, reveals some common themes: